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1 Introduction
Secret sharing (SS) [17] is a cryptographic scheme to encode a secret to multiple shares
being distributed to participants, so that only qualified (or authorized) sets of participants
can reconstruct the original secret from their shares. Traditionally both secret and shares
were classical information (bits). Several authors [4,8,18] extended the traditional SS to
quantum one so that a quantum secret can be encoded to quantum shares.
When we require unqualified sets of participants to have zero information of the secret,
the size of each share must be larger than or equal to that of secret. By tolerating partial
information leakage to unqualified sets, the size of shares can be smaller than that of secret.
Such an SS is called a ramp (or non-perfect) SS [1,14,21]. The quantum ramp SS was
proposed by Ogawa et al. [15]. In their construction [15] as well as its improvement [22], the
size of shares can be L times smaller relative to quantum secret than its previous construction
[4,8,18], where L is the number of qudits in quantum secret.
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In their construction [15], each share is a quantum state on a q-dimensional complex
linear space, and q has to be larger than or equal to the number n of participants. When n
is large, q also has to be large. But it is not clear whether or not such a large dimensional
quantum systems are always readily available. To deal with such a situation, we need a
quantum ramp SS allowing n > q. We stress that we study the ramp (non-perfect) SS while
[4,8,18] and their subsequent developments [11,12] studied the perfect SS, and that none of
the results in this paper are contained in [4,8,12,16,18].
On the other hand, the present paper can be regarded as a generalization of [8,16].
Because [8,16] studied connection between perfect quantum SS and the Calderbank-Shor-
Steane (CSS) quantum error-correcting codes [2,19], while our proposed encoding (6) of
quantum secret into quantum shares is the same as that of the q-ary CSS codes. The con-
nection between quantum ramp SS and quantum error correction seems first studied in [11].
Our new contributions that are not given in [11] are (a) necessary and sufficient conditions
for qualified sets and forbidden sets that can be easily checked by a digital computer, (b)
a quantum procedure partially reconstructing the quantum secret by an intermediate set of
shares, and (c) a construction of quantum ramp SS that allows arbitrarily large n for a fixed
q. Item (a) completely characterizes the qualified and the forbidden sets. Such a complete
characterization cannot be obtained by regarding the reconstruction of quantum secret as the
erasure decoding of quantum error-correcting codes [11]. Item (b) above clarifies how much
quantum information in the secret can be reconstructed by an intermediate set, which is a
share set neither qualified nor forbidden (unauthorized). We note that item (c) above does
not contradict with q >
√(n + 2)/2 [11, Eq. (5)], because [11, Eq. (5)] considered perfect
quantum SS.
It is well-known that all linear classical ramp SS can be constructed from a pair of
linear codes C2 ( C1 ⊆ Fnq [3,5], where Fq is the finite field with q elements. Smith [18]
studied connection between perfect linear classical SS and perfect quantum SS by using
the monotone span program that can express any perfect linear classical SS, but he did not
considered ramp SS. We call a quantum state in a q-dimensional system as a qudit. In this
paper we shall show the following.
Theorem 1 Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and J = {1, . . . , n} \ J. For x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq define
PJ(x) = (xi)i∈J . We define P˜J to be an Fq-linear map from C1/C2 to PJ(C1)/PJ(C2) sending
x+C2 ∈ C1/C2 to PJ(x)+PJ(C2) ∈ PJ(C1)/PJ(C2). A quantum ramp SS can be constructed
from any C2 ( C1 ⊆ Fnq, regardless of n and q.
1. The constructed quantum SS encodes a quantum secret of (dim C1 − dim C2) qudits to n
shares. Each share is a qudit.
2. A set J of participants can reconstruct
dim P˜J(ker(P˜J)) (1)
qudits out of (dim C1 − dim C2) qudits of the encoded quantum secret. If
dim P˜J(ker(P˜J)) = dim C1 − dim C2 (2)
then the set J of participants can reconstruct the secret perfectly. This means that J is
a qualified set. In this case J has no information of the secret, which means that J is a
forbidden (also called unauthorized) set.
3. The condition (2) is equivalent to both
dim PJ(C1) − dim PJ(C2) = dim C1 − dim C2 and (3)
dim PJ(C1) − dim PJ(C2) = 0. (4)
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Condition (4) is equivalent to
dim C⊥2 ∩ ker(PJ) − dim C⊥1 ∩ ker(PJ) = 0. (5)
4. Both (3) and (4) are also a necessary condition for J to be a qualified set.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes the encoding of secrets and shows
Item 1 in Theorem 1. Section 3 proposes the decoding of secrets and it shows Items 2 and 3
in Theorem 1. Section 4 proves Item 4 in Theorem 1 by computing the Holevo information
of the set J. It also computes the coherent information as a byproduct. Section 5 shows
that Theorem 1 completely characterizes the qualified and forbidden sets of the quantum
ramp SS by Ogawa et al. [15]. Section 6 gives an algebraic geometric (AG) construction. A
major benefit of the AG construction is that n can become arbitrarily large for a fixed q [20].
Section 7 gives concluding discussions.
2 Encoding Secrets
We shall propose a construction of a quantum ramp SS from a nested pair of linear codes
C2 ( C1 ⊆ Fnq. Our proposal is a quantum version of classical ramp SS proposed by Chen
et al. [3, Section 4.2]. Let Gi and H j be q-dimensional complex linear spaces. We also
assume that orthonormal bases of Gi and H j are indexed by Fq as {|s〉}s∈Fq . The quan-
tum secret is dim C1 − dim C2 qudits on
⊗dim C1−dim C2
i=1 Gi. Fix an Fq-linear isomorphism
f : Fdim C1−dim C2q → C1/C2. Also, {|s〉 | s ∈ Fdim C1−dim C2q } is an orthonormal basis of⊗dim C1−dim C2
i=1 Gi. We shall encode a quantum secret to n qudits in
⊗n
j=1 H j by a com-
plex linear isometric embedding. To specify such an embedding, it is enough to specify the
image of each basis state |s〉 ∈⊗dim C1−dim C2i=1 Gi. We encode |s〉 to
1√|C2|
∑
x∈ f (s)
|x〉 ∈
n⊗
j=1
H j. (6)
We note that the proposed encoding (6) is equivalent to that of CSS codes [2,19]. Recall that
by definition of f , f (s) is a subset of C1, f (s) ∩ f (s1) = ∅ if s , s1, and f (s) contains |C2|
vectors. From these properties we see that (6) defines a complex linear isometric embedding.
The quantum system H j is distributed to the j-th participant.
Example 2 We show a slightly modified variant of Ogawa et al. [15] as an example. Let
q = 7, n = 5, L = 3, α1 = 3, α2 = 5, α3 = 6, α4 = 1, α5 = 4. For s1, s2, s3 ∈ F7, |s1s2s3〉 is
encoded to
1√
7
∑
r∈F7
5⊗
j=1
|r + s1α j + s2α2j + s3α3j 〉. (7)
This encoding can be described by
C1 = {(r + s1α j + s2α2j + s3α3j) j=1,...,5 | r, s1, s2, s3 ∈ F7},
C2 = {(r, r, r, r, r) | r ∈ F7},
f (s1, s2, s3) = {(r + s1α j + s2α2j + s3α3j) j=1,...,5 | r ∈ F7}.
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3 Decoding Secrets
3.1 Preliminary Algebra
In this subsection we show Item 3 in Theorem 1 in order to introduce the proposed decod-
ing procedure. The equivalence between (4) and (5) follows from Forney’s second duality
lemma [7, Lemma 7] and ker(PJ) = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fnq | xi = 0 if i ∈ J}.
Equation (3) is equivalent to P˜J being an isomorphism, and (4) is equivalent to P˜J being
the zero map. From these observations we see that (3) and (4) imply (2) and vice versa. This
finishes the proof of Item 3 in Theorem 1.
Remark 3 Equation (5) corresponds to [9, Eq. (3)] for classical ramp SS.
3.2 Proposed Decoding Procedure
Suppose that the quantum secret is
∑
s∈FdimC1−dim C2q
α(s)|s〉 ∈
dim C1−dim C2⊗
i=1
Gi. (8)
It is encoded to n qudits as
∑
s∈Fdim C1−dim C2q
α(s) 1√|C2|
∑
x∈ f (s)
|x〉 ∈
n⊗
j=1
H j. (9)
Decompose ker(P˜J) to a direct sum V ⊕ (ker(P˜J) ∩ ker(P˜J)), and decompose C1/C2 to W ⊕
V ⊕∩ ker(P˜J). Let G(J) to be the complex linear space spanned by {|s〉 | f (s) ∈ V}. We have
dimG(J) = |P˜J(ker(P˜J))| because
dim P˜J(ker(P˜J))
= dim ker(P˜J) − dim ker(P˜J) ∩ ker(P˜J)
= dim V. (10)
The space
⊗dim C1−dim C2
i=1 Gi can be decomposed as G(J) ⊗ Grest, where Grest is the complex
linear space spanned by {|sKW 〉 | f (sKW ) ∈ W ⊕ ker(P˜J)}, and |sJ〉 ⊗ |sW + sK〉 ∈ G(J) ⊗ Grest
is identified with |s〉 ∈ ⊗dim C1−dim C2i=1 Gi for s = sJ + sW + sK with sJ ∈ f −1(V), sW ∈
f −1(W) and sK ∈ f −1(ker(P˜J)). This identification is a unitary map between G(J)⊗Grest and⊗dim C1−dim C2
i=1 Gi, because it is linear and preserves the inner product.
Example 4 We retain the notations from Example 2. Let J = {1, 2, 3} and J = {4, 5}.
Firstly we examine ker(P˜J) ⊂ C1/C2. When (s1, s2, s3) = (2, 1, 0) or (s1, s2, s3) = (0, 0, 1),
PJ( f (s1, s2, s3)) = PJ(C2), from which we see that ker(P˜J) is two-dimensional linear space
spanned by f (2, 1, 0) and f (0, 0, 1). On the other hand, PJ( f (2, 1, 0)) , PJ(C2) and PJ( f (0, 0, 1)) =
PJ(C2), which mean that ker(P˜J) ∩ ker(P˜J) is one-dimensional linear space spanned by
f (0, 0, 1). We also observe that V is the one-dimensional space spanned by f (2, 1, 0), that
ker(P˜J) is the one-dimensional space spanned by f (0, 0, 1). There is some freedom in choos-
ing W , for example, we can choose W as the one-dimensional space spanned by f (1, 0, 0).
Coding Theoretic Construction of Quantum Ramp Secret Sharing 5
G(J) is the 7-dimensional complex linear space spanned by {|2a〉 ⊗ |a〉 ⊗ |0〉 | a ∈ F7},
while Grest is the 49-dimensional complex linear space spanned by {|s1〉 ⊗ |0〉 ⊗ |s3〉 | s1, s3 ∈
F7}.
In this section we shall prove that a set J of participants can reconstruct the part of the
quantum secret (8) from (9). The reconstructed part is a state in G(J). By reordering indices
we may assume J = {1, . . . , |J|}. We also assume
dim P˜J(ker(P˜J)) > 0, (11)
otherwise the set J can reconstruct no part of the secret by the proposed decoding procedure.
The restriction of P˜J ◦ f to V is injective by the definition of V. This and the definitions
of V and W imply that there exists an Fq-linear isomorphism g1 from PJ(C1)/PJ(C2) to
Fdim PJ (C1)−dim PJ(C2)q with the following condition. When we write s = sJ + sW + sK in the
same way as the previous paragraph for s ∈ Fdim C1−dim C2q then g1(P̂J( f (s)) = (sJ , sW ) ∈
Fdim PJ (C1)−dim PJ(C2)q . If (2) holds then we have V = C1/C2 and we regard sW and sK as 0 and
sJ as s. Observe that g1 is inverting the restriction of P˜J ◦ f to V.
On the other hand, there also exists an Fq-linear epimorphism g2 from PJ(C1) to Fdim PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))q
that is one-to-one on every coset belonging to the factor linear space PJ(C1)/PJ(C2 ∩
ker(PJ)). The above map can be constructed as follows: Find a direct sum decomposition
of PJ(C1) = PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)) ⊕ U For x ∈ PJ(C1), find a decomposition x = x1 + x2 such
that x1 ∈ PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)) and x2 ∈ U. Then map x1 by a some fixed linear isomorphism
from PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)) to F
dim PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))
q , while ignoring x2. Observe that g2 is extracting
the PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ))-component.
By a construction similar to g2, there also exists an Fq-linear epimorphism g3 from
PJ(C1)/PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)) to F
dim PJ(C2)−dim PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))
q that is one-to-one on on every coset
belonging to the factor linear space PJ(C1)/PJ(C2) such that the value of g3 is determined
by sW , sK , and PJ(x) independently of sJ . Observe also that g3 is extracting the PJ(C2)-
component from the factor linear space PJ(C1)/PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)).
Consider the Fq-linear map g4 from PJ(C1) to Fdim PJ (C1)q sending v ∈ PJ(C1) to (g1(v +
PJ(C2)), g2(v), g3(v+PJ(C2∩ker(PJ)))). We see that g4 is an Fq-linear isomorphism because
it is surjective and the domain and the image of g4 have the same dimension.
For v ∈ PJ(C1), we can construct a unitary operation sending |v〉 ∈
⊗|J |
j=1 H j to |g4(v), 0〉 ∈⊗|J |
j=1 H j, where 0 is the zero vector of length |J| − dim PJ(C1). Since this unitary operation
does not change H|J |+1, . . . , Hn, it can be executed only by the first to the |J|-th participants.
Applying the unitary operation to (9) gives
∑
s∈FdimC1−dim C2q
α(s) 1√|C2|
∑
x∈ f (s)
|sJ , sW ,
g2(PJ(x)), g3(PJ(x) + PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ))), 0, PJ(x)〉. (12)
g2(PJ(x)) can become any vector in Fdim PJ(C2∩ker(PJ ))q independently of sJ , sW , sK and PJ(x).
Hereafter we denote g2(PJ(x)) by u1. For a fixed s ∈ Fdim C1−dim C2q PJ(x) can become any vec-
tor in the coset P˜J( f (s)) ∈ PJ(C1)/PJ(C2), and sW determines which coset of PJ(C1)/PJ(C2)
contains PJ(x) independently of sJ , sK and u1. Hereafter we denote the coset P˜J( f (s)) =
PJ(x) + PJ(C2) by g5(sW ). By the definition of g3, g3(PJ(x) + PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ))) is deter-
mined by only sW , sK and PJ(x), that is, independent of sJ . Hereafter we denote g3(PJ(x) +
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PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ))) by g6(sW , sK , PJ(x)). By using these notations we can rewrite (12) as∑
s∈FdimC1−dim C2q
α(s)|sJ〉 1√|C2|
∑
u1∈F
dim PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))
q
u2∈g5(sW )
|sW , u1, g6(sW , sK , u2), 0, u2〉, (13)
which means that the part |sJ〉 of the quantum secret (8) is reconstructed but in general
entangled with the rest of quantum system.
If the quantum secret is a product state written as
∑
s∈Fdim C1−dim C2q
α(s)|s〉 =

∑
sJ∈V
α(sJ)|sJ〉
 ⊗

∑
sW ,sK
α(sW , sK)|sW , sK〉

then (13) can be written as

∑
sJ∈V
α(sJ)|sJ〉
 ⊗

∑
sW ,sK
α(sW , sK) 1√|C2|
∑
u1∈F
dim PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))
q
u2∈g5(sW )
|sW , u1, g6(sW , sK , u2), 0, u2〉

,
and the reconstructed secret is not entangled with the rest of quantum system.
Observe also that the number of qudits in the reconstructed part is dim V = dim P˜J(ker(P˜J))
and if (2) holds then the entire secret is reconstructed. Because the complement of any qual-
ified set is forbidden by [15, Proposition 3], we see that the set J of participants has no
information on the quantum secret (8) if (2) holds. This finishes the proof of Item 2 in The-
orem 1. ⊓⊔
Example 5 We retain the notations from Example 4. We have J = {1, 2, 3}, dim PJ(C1) = 3,
and dim PJ(C2) = 1. dim PJ(C1)/PJ(C2) = 2.
When we express
s = a(2, 1, 0)︸    ︷︷    ︸
=sJ
+ s3(0, 0, 1)︸     ︷︷     ︸
=sK
+ s1(1, 0, 0)︸     ︷︷     ︸
=sW
,
and fix r in (7), the index vector x in (7) becomes
x = (r + a + 3s1 + 6s3, r + 5s1 + 6s3, r + 6a + 6s1 + 6s3,
r + 3a + s1 + s3, r + 3a + 4s1 + s3).
g1((x1, x2, x3)+PJ(C2)) = (3x2−x1−2x3, 2x2−x1−x3) = (a, s1). We have C2∩ker(PJ) = {0}
and g2 is the zero map. We have g3(x1, x2) = 2x1 − x3 = r + 3a + 6s3 and g4(x1, x2) =
(a, s1, r+3a+6s3). Therefore, after applying the proposed decoding procedure, the state (7)
of encoded shares becomes
1√
7
∑
r∈F7
|a, s1, r + 3a + 6s3, r + 3a + s1 + s3, r + 3a + 4s1 + s3〉
=
1√
7
∑
r′∈F7
|a, s1, r′ + 6s3, r′ + s1 + s3, r′ + 4s1 + s3〉
where r′ = r + 3a.
We see that s1 determines, independently of both a and s3, the coset {(r′ + s1 + s3, r′ +
4s1 + s3) | r′ ∈ F7}, which is g5(sW ). PJ(x) = (r′ + s1 + s3, r′ + 4s1 + s3), s1 and s3 uniquely
determine g3(x1, x2, x3) = r′ + 6s3 which is g6.
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4 Holevo Information and Coherent Information of a Set of Shares
4.1 Holevo Information
In this section we prove that both (3) and (4) are necessary for J to be a qualified set. We use
the Holevo information [13] defined as follows. Let Sin and Sout be sets of density matrices,
Γ a completely positive trace-preserving map from Sin to Sout, {ρ1, . . . , ρm} ⊂ Sin, and P a
probability distribution on {ρ1, . . . , ρm}. The Holevo information is defined as
K(P, {ρ1, . . . , ρm}, Γ) = H

m∑
i=1
P(ρi)Γ(ρi)
 −
m∑
i=1
P(ρi)H(Γ(ρi)), (14)
where H(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy counted in logq. The Holevo information
essentially expresses the classical information that can be transferred over Γ [13].
Let ΓJ be the completely positive trace-preserving map from S(
⊗dim C1−dim C2
i=1 Gi) to
S(⊗ j∈J H j) induced by the encoding procedure proposed in Section 2, where S(·) denotes
the set of density matrices on a complex space ·. By KJ we denote
K(uniform distribution, {|s〉〈s| | s ∈ Fdim C1−dim C2q }, ΓJ). (15)
By [15, Theorem 1] if
KJ < dim C1 − dim C2 (16)
then J is not a qualified set. The encoding procedure in Section 2 is a pure state scheme [15,
Section 2], that is, the quantum state of all the shares is pure if the encoded quantum secret
is pure. By [15, Proposition 3], if J is not a forbidden set, then J is not a qualified set. By
[15, Theorem 1] if
KJ > 0 (17)
then J is not a forbidden set.
We shall prove the next proposition. By (3), (4), (16) and (17), Proposition 6 implies
that both (3) and (4) are necessary for J to be a qualified set.
Proposition 6
KJ = dim PJ(C1) − dim PJ(C2). (18)
Proof ΓJ(|s〉〈s|) is the partial trace of (9) over
⊗
j∈J H j. By the definition of partial trace
ΓJ(|s〉〈s|)
=
1
|C2|
∑
x1 ,x2∈ f (s)
|PJ(x1)〉〈PJ(x2)| 〈PJ(x1)|PJ(x2)〉︸             ︷︷             ︸
=1⇔x2∈x1+ker(PJ )
=
1
|C2|
∑
u∈PJ( f (s))
∑
x1∈ f (s)∩P−1J (u)
∑
x2∈ f (s)∩P−1J (u)
|PJ(x1)〉〈PJ(x2)|
=
1
|C2|
∑
u∈PJ( f (s))

∑
x1∈ f (s)∩P−1J (u)
|PJ(x1)〉


∑
x2∈ f (s)∩P−1J (u)
〈PJ(x2)|

=
1
|C2|
∑
u∈PJ( f (s))

∑
x1∈ f (s)∩((0,u)+ker(PJ ))
|PJ(x1)〉


∑
x2∈ f (s)∩((0,u)+ker(PJ ))
〈PJ(x2)|
 . (19)
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For u1, u2 ∈ PJ( f (s)), if f (s) ∩ ((0, u1) + ker(PJ)) = f (s) ∩ ((0, u2) + ker(PJ)) then x1 and
x2 in (19) are taken over the same set PJ(x) + PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)), where x is any vector in
f (s) ∩ ((0, u1) + ker(PJ)). Otherwise x1 and x2 in (19) are taken over two disjoint sets in
PJ( f (s)). So (19) is equal to
1
|C2|
∑
A∈PJ( f (s))/∼

∑
v∈A
|v〉


∑
v∈A
〈v|
 , (20)
where ∼ is the equivalence relation that defines v1, v2 ∈ PJ(Fnq) to be equivalent if v1 ∈ v2 +
PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)). (20) is an equal mixture of |PJ(C2)/PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ))| projection matrices
to non-overlapping orthogonal spaces, therefore its von Neumann entropy is dim PJ(C2) −
dim PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)), which is the second term in the right hand side of (14).
By (20), the density matrix of the first term in RHS of of (14) is
1
qdim C1−dim C2
∑
s∈FdimC1−dim C2q
1
|C2|
∑
A∈PJ( f (s))/∼

∑
v∈A
|v〉


∑
v∈A
〈v|

=
1
|C1|
,
∑
A∈PJ(C1)/PJ (C2∩ker(PJ ))

∑
v∈A
|v〉


∑
v∈A
〈v|
 . (21)
The von Neumann entropy of (21) is
dim PJ(C1) − dim PJ(C2 ∩ ker(PJ)) (22)
by the same argument as the last paragraph. By (14) KJ = dim PJ(C1) − dim PJ(C2). ⊓⊔
4.2 Coherent Information
We use the same notation as (14). Denote by ΓE the channel to the environment so that any
pure state is mapped to a pure state by Γ ⊗ ΓE . The channel to the environment for ΓJ is ΓJ .
Then the coherent information of the input state ρ and the channel Γ is defined by [13]
H(Γ(ρ)) − H(ΓE(ρ)). (23)
Equation (23) can become negative. The quantum capacity is expressed by the maximum of
the coherent information over ρ [6].
The coherent information of ΓJ and the completely mixed secret 1qdimC1−dim C2
∑
s∈FdimC1−dim C2q |s〉〈s|
is (22) subtracted by (22) with J substituted by J. Therefore the coherent information is
dim PJ(C1) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ) − (dim PJ(C1) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ)). (24)
We consider to maximize (24) by replacing C1 by D such that C2 ⊂ D ⊂ C1. This amounts
to maximize (23) over the quantum state completely mixed over the subspace spanned by
{|s〉 | f (s) ⊂ D}.
Lemma 7 Let D be as above. Define
D′ = C2 + (D ∩ ker(PJ)).
Then we have
dim PJ(D) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ) − (dim PJ(D) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ))
= dim PJ(D′) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ) − (dim PJ(D′) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ)). (25)
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Proof Let D = D′⊕D′′. Then dim D′′ = dim PJ(D′′) because D′′∩ker(PJ) = {0}. Therefore
the D′′ component in D does not help to increase the value of (24). Thus D′ yields the same
value for (24) as D and we have (25). ⊓⊔
So we see that D = C2 + (C1 ∩ ker(PJ)) maximizes the coherent information to its
maximum value
dim PJ(C2 + (C1 ∩ ker(PJ))) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ)
− (dim PJ(C2 + (C1 ∩ ker(PJ))︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
=dim PJ(C2)
− dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ))
= dim PJ(C2 + (C1 ∩ ker(PJ))) − (dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ) + dim PJ(C2) − dim C2 ∩ ker(PJ))︸                                                                 ︷︷                                                                 ︸
=dim PJ(C2)
= dim P˜J(ker P˜J).
We remark that the proposed decoding procedure in Section 3 reconstructs precisely that
number of qudits in the secret.
5 Analysis of the Conventional Scheme
In this section we show that the conventional quantum ramp secret SS [15] can be regarded
as a special case of the proposed construction, and its qualified and forbidden sets can be
identified by Theorem 1. Let α1, . . . , αn be pairwise distinct nonzero1 elements in Fq, which
correspond to x1, . . . , xn in [15]. Denote (α1, . . . , αn) by α. Let v ∈ (Fq \ {0})n. Then the
generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSn,k(α, v) is [10, Section 10.§8]
{(v1h(α1), . . . , vnh(αn)) | deg h(x) ≤ k − 1}, (26)
where h(x) is a univariate polynomial over Fq. Let 1 = (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Fnq and αL = (αL1 ,
. . . , αLn ) ∈ Fnq. The conventional scheme [15] is a special case of the proposed construction
with C1 = GRSn,k(α, 1) and C2 = GRSn,k−L(α, αL). Observe that C2 ( C1, dim C1 = k,
and dim C2 = k − L. By the property of the generalized Reed-Solomon codes (see e.g. [10,
Section 11.§4]), any subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} satisfies both (3) and (4) if |J| ≥ dim C1 and
|J| ≤ dim C2. Observe that the original restriction n = dim C1+dim C2 [15] is removed here.
6 Algebraic Geometric Construction
In this section we give a construction of C1 ⊃ C2 based on algebraic geometry (AG) codes.
A major benefit of the AG codes is that n can become arbitrarily large for a fixed q [20].
For terminology and mathematical notions of AG codes, please refer to [20]. Let F/Fq be
an algebraic function field of one variable over Fq, P1, . . . , Pn pairwise distinct places of
degree one in F, and G1, G2 divisors of F whose supports contain none of P1, . . . , Pn. We
assume G1 ≥ G2. Denote by L(G1) the Fq-linear space associated with G1. The functional
AG code associated with G1, P1, . . . , Pn is defined as
C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) = {( f (P1), . . . , f (Pn)) | f ∈ L(G1)}.
1 In [15] αi = 0 was not explicitly prohibited, but an author of [15] informed that αi must be nonzero for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
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Since G1 ≥ G2 we have C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) ⊇ C(G2, P1, . . . , Pn). We further assume C(G1,
P1, . . . , Pn) , C(G2, P1, . . . , Pn).
Theorem 8 The ramp quantum SS constructed from C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) ) C(G2, P1, . . . ,
Pn) encodes dim C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) − dim C(G2, P1, . . . , Pn) qudits to n shares. We have
dim C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) − dim C(G2, P1, . . . , Pn)
≥ deg G1 − deg G2 − g(F), (27)
where g(F) denotes the genus of F. A set J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} is a qualified set and its complement
J is a forbidden set if
|J| ≥ max{1 + deg G1, n − (deg G2 − 2g(F) + 1)}. (28)
Proof Equation (27) follows just from
dim C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn) = dimL(G1) − dimL(G1 − P1 − · · · − Pn), (29)
and the Riemann-Roch theorem [20]
deg G1 − g(F) + 1 ≤ dimL(G1) ≤ max{0, deg G1 + 1}, (30)
where the left inequality of (30) becomes equality if
deg G1 ≥ 2g(F) − 1. (31)
Firstly we claim that (3) and (4) hold if
|J| ≥ 1 + deg G1, (32)
|J| ≤ deg G2 − 2g(F) + 1. (33)
By reordering indices we may assume that J = {1, . . . , |J|}. Observe that
PJ(C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn)) = C(G1, P1, . . . , P|J |). (34)
If (32) holds then by (30) we have L(G1 − P1 − · · · − P|J |) = {0}, which means that L(G1) is
isomorphic to C(G1, P1, . . . , P|J |) as an Fq-linear space by (29). By the same argument we
also see that L(G1) is isomorphic to C(G1, P1, . . . , Pn). Thus we have seen that (32) implies
(3).
If (33) holds then
deg(G2 − P|J |+1 − · · · − Pn) ≥ 2g(F) − 1,
which implies by (31)
dimL(G2 − P|J |+1 − · · · − Pn) = deg G2 − |J| − g(F) + 1. (35)
By the same argument
dimL(G2) = deg G2 − g(F) + 1. (36)
Equations (29), (35) and (36) imply dim C(G2, P|J |+1, . . . , Pn) = |J|, which in turn implies
C(G2, P|J |+1, . . . , Pn) = F|J |q . Therefore we see that (33) implies (4).
Finally noting (28) ⇒ (32) and (33) finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
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Remark 9 As the generalized Reed-Solomon codes is a special case of AG codes with
g(F) = 0 [20], Section 5 can also be deduced from Theorem 8 instead of using [10, Section
11.§4].
Theorem 10 We retain notations from Theorem 8 and assume deg G1 < n. The number (1)
of qudits in quantum secret that can be decoded by J is
dim
L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2)
(L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2)) ∩ (L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2)) . (37)
Proof Equation (1) is equal to
dim ker(P˜J) − dim ker(P˜J) ∩ ker(P˜J). (38)
Since we assume deg G1 < n, the evaluation map h ∈ L(G1) 7→ (h(P1), . . . , h(Pn) ∈ Fnq is
injective and we can deal with the space of functions in L(G1) to count the dimensions of
(38).
For h1 + L(G2) ∈ L(G1)/L(G2), its corresponding coset belongs to ker(P˜J) if and only
if there exists h2 ∈ L(G2) such that h1(P j) − h2(P j) = 0 for all j ∈ J, which is equivalent to
h1 −h2 ∈ L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j). In other words, the coset h1 +L(G2) satisfies the above condition
if and only if there exists h′1 ∈ L(G1 −
∑
j∈J P j) such that h1 ≡ h′1 (mod L(G2)). The
dimension of space of cosets h1 + L(G2) with the above condition is given by
dim
L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2)
L(G2) . (39)
Moreover, while satisfying the condition of the last paragraph, the coset corresponding
to h1 + L(G2) belongs to ker(P˜J) if and only if there exists another h′′1 ∈ L(G1 −
∑
j∈J P j)
such that h1 ≡ h′′1 (mod L(G2)). The dimension of space of cosets h1 + L(G2) with the
above two conditions is given by
dim
(L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2)) ∩ (L(G1 −∑ j∈J P j) +L(G2))
L(G2) . (40)
By (38), subtracting (40) from (39) gives (37). ⊓⊔
7 Conclusion
We have shown that a quantum ramp secret sharing scheme can be constructed from any
nested pair of linear codes, and also shown necessary and sufficient conditions for the qual-
ified and the forbidden sets as Theorem 1. A construction of nested linear codes is given by
the algebraic geometry in Theorem 8. The following issues are future research agenda.
What is a better construction of C1 ) C2 than Theorem 8 when q < n? In particular,
(33) should use both divisors G1 and G2 because (3) and (4) use both of nested linear codes.
Also, J corresponds to a set of Fq-rational points on an algebraic curve when AG codes are
used, but only the size of J is taken into account in (33). The geometry of J should also be
taken into account. We shall investigate them in future.
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